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Abstract 
 
This paper addresses two related puzzles confronting students of regional and international inte-
gration: Why do states willingly pool and delegate sovereignty within international institutions? 
What accounts for the timing and content of regional integration agreements? Most theories of in-
tegration suggest that states integrate in order to solve problems of incomplete information and 
reduce transaction costs and other barriers to economic growth. In contrast I argue that integra-
tion can serve to establish a credible commitment that rules out the risk of future conflict among 
states of unequal power. Specifically, I suggest that integration presents an alternative to preven-
tive war as a means to preclude a rising revisionist power from establishing a regional hegemony. 
The implication is that it is not countries enjoying stable and peaceful relations that are most likely 
to pursue integration, but rather countries that find themselves caught in a regional security di-
lemma, which they hope to break out of by means of institutionalized cooperation. I evaluate this 
                                                           
*An abbreviated version of this paper is forthcoming in the Journal of Comparative European Poli-
tics, Volume 6, 2008.  proposition against evidence from two historical cases of regional integration: the German Zoll-
verein and the European Communities. 
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Uneven Power and the Pursuit of Peace:  
How Regional Power Transitions Motivate Integration 
 
“Peace is not the end of struggle, but the finer organization of it” (Charles E. Merriam, 1945) 
 
This paper addresses two related puzzles confronting students of regional and in-
ternational integration: why do states willingly surrender sovereign prerogatives within 
international institutions? what accounts for the timing and institutional form of specific 
integration schemes? Three schools of thought dominate the theoretical literature: realists 
portray integration as a means of reinforcing regional alliances against outside threats; 
liberals hold that states integrate in order to reduce the transaction costs of recurring co-
operation and eliminate negative externalities from economic interdependence; construc-
tivists depict integration as revealed convergence towards a shared regional identity. 
Drawing on rationalist theories of war and delegation, I develop an alternative view, 
which points to changing power differentials among integrating states as a key explana-
tory variable. My main argument is that integration can serve as a credible commitment 
mechanism that rules out future violent conflict among states of unequal strength. Specifi-
cally, I argue, integration presents an alternative to preventive war as a means to pre-
clude a rising power from establishing regional dominance. According to standard Inter-
national Relations (IR) theory, states that face a threat of domination from a rising chal-
lenger can adopt one of two strategies: they can either balance power—by forming de-
fensive alliances or by attacking a rising state preventively before it grows too power-
ful—or they can bandwagon with a stronger state in the hope that it will exercise its pre-
ponderant power benignly. Balancing and bandwagoning are not, however, the only so-
lutions to strategic dilemmas generated by uneven growth rates. Another option is to cre-
ate an institution that eliminates the discretion to use force arbitrarily. I call this strategy 
“institutional binding.” The logic of “institutional binding” suggests that integration is 
motivated by a desire to remove the risks of conflict associated with regional power tran-
sitions. This leads to the seemingly counter-intuitive conclusion that countries that enjoy 
stable and peaceful relations or exhibit high degrees of shared identity are not the most 
likely candidates for integration. Rather, integration is most probable among countries 
that find themselves caught in a regional security dilemma, which they hope to escape by 
means of institutionalized cooperation. I evaluate the argument against evidence from 
two cases of integration: the European Communities and the German Zollverein. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Part 1 gives a brief review of extant integration 
theories. Part 2 introduces “institutional binding” as a solution to the power transition 
dilemma. Part 3 presents evidence from two historical cases in which integration was 
pursued by a group of declining states as a way to bind a rising challenger. While this 
section does not provide a full test of the institutional binding thesis, the applicability of 
the argument in both historical cases strengthens confidence in the framework. Part 4 
considers further implications of the argument. 
 
I. THE LITERATURE 
 
Broadly speaking, existing theories of integration focus on three categories of 
state motivation: geopolitical or power-based interests, economic interests, and ideation-  2 
al interests. Respectively, these define distinctive “realist,” “liberal” and “constructivist” 
explanations for integration. With a few notable exceptions (e.g. Nye, 1968; Haas and 
Schmitter 1964; Mattli 1999) theorists working within each of these approaches have fo-
cused primarily on explaining integration among West European states after World War 
II. However, the core insights of these studies, if correct, should hold for other instances 
of integration. If they do not, then they should be either revised (e.g., by more carefully 
delimiting scope conditions) or rejected. 
 
Power-based theories. The essence of power-based integration theories is in the 
link between regional cooperation and underlying national security interests (Gowa 
1994; Grieco 1990). There are three power-based explanations that one encounters most 
often. The first builds on classic balance-of-power theory. In this view, regional integra-
tion serves to reinforce balancing against external enemies. One frequently comes across 
this argument in the literature on political leagues and confederations, where integration 
is historically portrayed as a way for smaller states to boost their military and economic 
power vis-à-vis larger, threatening neighbors (see Wheare 1943; Lister 1999; Forsyth 
1981). The same logic is commonly applied to postwar Europe, where integration is de-
picted as a way to balance the Soviet threat and improve Europe’s influence and stand-
ing in a world dominated by superpowers (Waltz 1986: 58-9; Mearsheimer 1990: 47; Joffe 
1984).1 The upshot of this version of realism is that European integration is ephemeral; in 
the absence of a powerful external threat and a bipolar international structure, integra-
tion is destined eventually to collapse. 
 
Compelling in many ways, realist balance-of-power logic fails to explain why 
political or economic integration is required to counter external threats. While exoge-
nous military threats may provide incentives to strengthen regional cooperation, it is not 
clear why balancing against such threats would dictate the creation of comprehensive 
politico-economic unions in which sovereign prerogatives are delegated or pooled as op-
posed to, say, a conventional military alliance that would place fewer constraints on sov-
ereignty. Unless it can be shown that effective military balancing necessitates politico-
economic integration, the causal link between external threat and regional integration 
remains tenuous at best.2  
 
A second power-based explanation is derived from hegemonic stability theory. 
The theory of hegemonic stability links the creation of international regimes to the pres-
ence of a dominant state that supplies the rules and sanctioning mechanisms necessary 
to sustain cooperation (Kindleberger 1973). Along similar lines, Mattli (1999: 51-6) ar-
                                                 
1A related argument views integration as a way to strengthen the position of integrating states in 
a world of fierce economic competition. This version gained popularity at the end of the Cold 
War as realists, challenged by the simultaneous collapse of bipolarity and the deepening of Euro-
pean integration manifest in the move to EMU, argued that the persistence of integration reflected 
a desire to balance the growing economic and political might of the U.S. and Japan (see Sandholtz 
& Zysman 1989; Garrett 1992). The problem with this explanation is that competition from the 
U.S. and Japan was fierce also in the 1970s—a period during which European integration stag-
nated (see Keohane & Hoffmann 1991: 22-3). 
2There is little indication that economic integration serves to strengthen military alliances. Evi-
dence suggests that, whereas states show a greater propensity to trade with allies than with ri-
vals, trade only nominally increases the cohesion of existing alliances (Gowa 1994).    3 
gues that regional integration requires the presence of a dominant state that assumes the 
role of “regional paymaster” and acts as focal point in the coordination of rules and poli-
cies. Efird, Kugler and Genna (2003: 300) contend that domination of a hierarchy by a 
single country imposes higher costs for any conflict within that hierarchy and lower 
costs for integration. The higher costs of conflict are associated with the dominant 
power’s desire to maintain a peaceful status quo, which is consistent with stable eco-
nomic growth; the lower costs of integration reflect the dominant power’s ability to ab-
sorb the costs of integration. Other scholars have portrayed integration as an instance of 
“soft hegemony” (Pedersen 1998) or “benign unipolarity” (Kupchan 1998) whereby a 
dominant power seeks to assert its influence through cooperation rather than domina-
tion, thereby hoping to persuade other states to accept its preferred order. 
 
Hegemonic stability theory at first sight appears to offer a persuasive explana-
tion for integration. As Deutsch et al. (1957) observe, “contrary to the balance-of-power 
theory, [integration] seem[s] to develop most frequently around cores of strength.” His-
torical evidence appears to bolster this observation. Many regional communities have 
been headed by regional great powers, for example, Germany in the European Commu-
nity, Prussia in the German Zollverein and Holland in the United Dutch Provinces. 
Closer scrutiny of the empirical evidence reveals, however, that while regional great 
powers play a central role in integration schemes, they are seldom uniquely favored by 
integration. Not only do they tend to shoulder the bulk of the costs associated with inte-
gration, but strong states are often heavily underrepresented in regional decision-
making bodies. The proportion of German votes in the European Council of Ministers 
has historically been small compared to Germany’s share of population and GDP (author 
2001). The same has been true for great powers in other regional unions. Holland com-
prised more than half the population of the United Dutch Provinces but possessed only 
a single vote in the central decision-making assembly. Prussia represented fifty percent 
of population in the German Zollverein and accounted for most of the union’s material 
wealth but controlled only a quarter of the votes in the legislative Customs Congress. 
While the hegemonic stability theory points to incentives for strong states to sponsor co-
operation as a way to promote economic growth and stability, it fails to explain why a 
would-be dominant state would accept a position of relative inferiority within regional 
institutions, thus limiting its influence over policy. 
 
A third power-based explanation focuses on balancing of power within a region. 
This explanation views integration as a way to anchor and bind a powerful state 
through ties of economic interest and shared rules and norms (Grieco 1995; Baun 1996). 
A prominent example is Grieco’s analysis of European Monetary Union (EMU) in terms 
of what he labels a “neo-realist inspired voice-opportunity thesis” (1995a, 1995b). Build-
ing on Hirshman’s classic theory on “voice and exit,” Grieco (1995b: 34-6) suggests that 
weaker states may favor institutional ties with a stronger partner as a way to influence 
its policies and avoid political subordination. He argues that the decision to adopt EMU 
was driven by a desire to introduce greater symmetry in influence over monetary mat-
ters than existed within the European Monetary System where the Bundesbank played a 
hegemonic role. This logic is consistent with the institutional binding theory set forth in 
this article. But the problem with the argument is that it is under-theorized. While we 
may accept that weaker states are keen, as a rule, to impose institutional constraints on   4 
stronger powers, we lack a convincing explanation for why Germany—a monetary 
hegemon—would agree to be bound within the EMU and for how the same logic might be 
extended to explain other instances of integration.3 
 
Liberal Approaches. Whereas power-based theories focus on security external-
ities from integration, liberals depict integration as a way for states to reduce transaction 
costs, reap economies of scale and manage negative policy externalities in conditions of 
growing economic interdependence (Milward 1984: 1992; Moravcsik 1998; Mattli 1999; 
Martin 1993; Milner 1997). Two main features distinguish liberal from power-based ap-
proaches. First, liberals explain integration, not by reference to geopolitical concerns, but 
as a function of structural changes in the global economy, which increase the benefits to 
cross-border economic exchange. Second, liberals emphasize the importance of domestic 
politics in shaping state preferences. Demand for integration is not dictated solely by 
shifts in the global economy but reflects the impact of such shifts on the preferences of 
key domestic interest groups (see Milner 1997; Moravcsik 1998). 
 
A prominent liberal explanation for postwar European integration is given by 
historian Alan Milward (1984, 1992). He observes that most West European states were 
so weakened by their experiences over the period of 1929-45 that they essentially had to 
recreate themselves as functioning units in the immediate postwar period. To reassert 
their capacity to rule effectively, governments had to show themselves responsive to a 
broad range of societal demands. However, growing interdependence meant that the 
political and economic reforms needed to satisfy social welfare demands could only be 
advanced through cooperation at the regional level. Integration therefore constituted a 
way to ‘”rescue’” the European nation-state by creating economic conditions that would 
ensure the continued allegiance of its citizens (Milward 1992: 27; Milward & Sørensen 
1993: 5).  
 
 Walter Mattli advances a second version of the liberal argument. To Mattli the 
starting point for integration is the advent of new technologies or political changes that 
increase the scope of markets beyond the boundaries of a single state. When such 
changes occur, actors who stand to gain from wider markets—usually large producer 
groups—demand a change in existing governance structures to realize these gains (ibid.: 
46, 58). For example, Mattli explains integration in nineteenth-century Germany as a re-
sult of the building of the railway, which expanded the distance across which individu-
als and firms could profitably trade with one another (ibid.: 115). These new trading op-
portunities coincided with general economic hardship that led politicians to look favor-
ably upon integration as a way to boost economic efficiency and improve reelection 
                                                 
3Grieco offers two explanations for why Germany agreed to grant its smaller partners “voice op-
portunities” in monetary affairs. First, he argues, despite a belief that EMU would reduce German 
influence in monetary affairs, German officials might have had reason to believe they could still 
defend key German monetary objectives, including price stability. Second, he suggests, Germany 
at the end of the 1980s had come to believe that it needed to accept some limitations on its influ-
ence on European monetary affairs as the price for fostering a more effective European coalition 
against Japan (Grieco 1995a). The first explanation suggests that German monetary policy is not 
significantly constrained by EMU. The second explanation suggests that balancing against an ex-
ternal threat, rather than a desire to constrain German monetary power, was the impetus behind 
EMU.    5 
prospects (ibid.: 44-50. For similar arguments see Grossman & Helpman 1994; and Mil-
ner 1997: 87). Similarly, Moravcsik claims with respect to postwar West European inte-
gration that, “at its core, European integration has been dictated by the need to adopt 
through policy coordination to [global] trends in technology and in economic policy.” 
He further asserts that demand for integration originated chiefly among powerful or-
ganized domestic producer groups that reacted to rising opportunities for lucrative re-
gional trade (1998, 39, 87). 
 
Evidence from postwar integration in Europe would appear to support liberal 
theory. In the 1950s West European countries faced strong pressures to cooperate on re-
building their war-devastated economies. This combined with an exogenous increase in 
opportunities for international trade and capital movement to create incentives for re-
moving barriers to cross-border trade and investment, including tariffs, detailed regula-
tion and fluctuating exchange rates—all of which have been core targets in the European 
integration process. A predominantly economic analysis of the benefits from market de-
regulation and monetary alignment fails, however, to account for key aspects of the 
European integration process. First, while there were clear benefits to liberalizing trade 
and investment in postwar Europe, it is not clear why this would necessitate the creation 
of a comprehensive and exclusive politico-economic union such as the EEC, as opposed 
to a broader free trade area (FTA) among all the OEEC countries—an option that was, for 
example, favored by Britain and supported by many European business groups.4 It 
seems likely that an FTA embracing all the OEEC countries would have offered better op-
portunities for European producers to expand their exports than the geographically nar-
rower and politically more constraining ESCE/EEC. Second, interdependence is not a reli-
able predictor of integration. By many accounts, economic interdependence among West 
European countries was lower in the 1950s and 1960s (when integration was initiated) 
than at the end of the nineteenth century or the beginning of the twentieth. 
 
Identity-based Perspectives. Whereas liberal and power-based accounts empha-
size material incentives to integrate, constructivists since Karl Deutsch have focused on 
the role of communication in fostering shared identities among peoples. The Deutschian 
theory of “security communities” holds that communicative action, (frequently but not 
necessarily linked to the exchange of goods and services) triggers processes of social 
learning, which lead to mutual identification and trust among populations in different 
countries. Over time, such identification causes people to reorient their loyalties away 
                                                 
4Many national business groups and economists opposed the creation of a customs union. The 
estimated net gain from removing tariffs was generally calculated to be small and “certainly 
not worth the political effort required to create a customs union—much less one which in-
volved a promise to proceed towards political unification” (see Viner 1950; Milward 1992: 122-
23). British leaders in particular were vehemently opposed to a system that implied a substantial 
surrender of national sovereignty merely for the sake of free trade. As one British official com-
mented, if Europe wanted freer trade, the remedy lay in simply obeying the liberalization pro-
cedures of the OEEC. No new institutions were needed! (Nutting 1966: 83-4). In an attempt to 
sidestep the Benelux plan for a European Economic Community, the British Government pro-
posed in July 1956 to create an industrial FTA embracing all the OEEC countries (see Griffith 1990: 
6-7, Macmillan 1969: 69; Charlton 1983: 183, 195). This so-called “Plan G” was rejected by France.    6 
from the nation-state towards larger regional communities.5 It is important to note that 
in a Deutschian framework social assimilation is not assumed to lead to the adoption of 
shared legal or institutional frameworks. To Deutsch, integration was not associated 
with specific institutions but was synonymous with the emergence of a shared regional 
identity. This raises the prospect that communication and social assimilation do not 
cause political or economic integration but may instead be caused by the prior institution-
alization of politico-economic exchange. 
 
The possibility of an inverse causality between socialization and integration also 
looms large in present constructivist studies. The basic thrust of constructivism is that 
integration has a socializing effect on actors (which may or may not lead them to deepen 
their institutional cooperation), not that social assimilation can per se explain the initia-
tion of economic or political cooperation. The focus is on how institutions transform or 
“constitute” actors’ interests and identities through processes of socialization and social 
learning (Risse and Wiener 2001; Checkel 1999c; March and Olson 1998; Aspinwall and 
Schneider 2000), not how institutions come into place in the first place. While construc-
tivism may provide a good guide to understanding social and political interaction with-
in a densely institutionalized region such as Europe, it is thus limited in its ability to ac-
count for the onset of integration. After all, European sentiment was low among general 
publics after the Second World War, and although there were significant pro-European 
inclinations among political elites, their Europeanism can hardly be explained as a result 
of prior socialization. 
 
In the remainder of this paper, I discuss the role of regional power transitions in 
determining the onset and form of integration. A focus on regional power transition 
should not, however, be read as a wholesale rejection of the explanatory factors identi-
fied by existing theories. External threats and economic interdependence may matter on 
the margin and may help to shape both the geographic scope and functional content of 
regional integration schemes. Yet, neither factor can by itself explain the onset of integra-
tion. If integration were primarily driven by a desire to reduce economic transaction 
costs or to balance against external security threats, both the timing and form of integra-
tion would differ from what we observe empirically. For example, I shall argue below, 
had West European integration been mainly motivated by a desire to boost regional 
trade as liberal scholars claim, integration would most likely have taken the form of a 
loose FTA, rather than a comprehensive politico-economic union. 
 
II. THE LOGIC OF INSTITUTIONAL BINDING 
 
The central argument of this paper is that integration is favored by declining 
states as a means of controlling and constraining a rising partner. Specifically, integra-
tion can substitute for preventive war as a way to preclude a rising regional power from 
establishing local hegemony. My aim in this section is to specify the theoretical condi-
tions in which declining states may have incentives and opportunities to “bind” a rising 
                                                 
5In the Deutschian framework integration is defined as a process of cultural assimilation, leading 
to the formation of “pluralistic security communities” in which states retain legal independence 
but where their interactions are guided by feelings of “we-ness” and by “dependable expecta-
tions of peaceful change” (Deutsch 1969: 122).   7 
challenger and to discuss how integration can enable them to do so. The following sec-
tion examines two historical examples in which states have solved a strategic dilemma 
associated with a regional power transition by integrating with a rising state rather than 
balancing against it. 
 
At the root of the power transition dilemma is a commitment problem. Imagine 
two states; one whose power is declining and which favors the status quo, another 
whose power is growing and which is revisionist.6 Standard IR-theory tells us that the 
declining state has an incentive to attack the rising challenger before it grows too power-
ful. In an anarchical world, a significant increase in the capabilities of any state must be 
met by countervailing power to safeguard the independence of other states.7 It is plausi-
ble that a rising state, while still relatively weak, would wish to promise not to take ad-
vantage of its future strength if it believed it could thereby escape a preventive attack; 
yet, since it would have no incentive ex post to abide by this agreement, the promise 
would not be credible. War therefore results although, in theory, a negotiated settlement 
may exist that both sides would prefer over fighting (Fearon 1995). While it has long 
been recognized that power transitions are associated with a high likelihood of war,8 
there is an emerging consensus among formal theorists of war that the fundamental rea-
son uneven growth rates lead to violent conflict is this basic commitment problem.9  
                                                 
6The distinction between “status quo” and “revisionist” states is a staple of classical balance of 
power and power transition theory. Status quo states are usually those states which won the last 
major war and created a new international order to serve their interests. Revisionist states are of-
ten those that have increased their material power after the existing international order was es-
tablished and privileges and entitlements divided. See, e.g., Organski and Kugler 1980. Defensive 
realists hold that preventive motivation applies whether or not a growing state is believed to be 
revisionist. See Levy 1987. 
7Gulick 1955; Waltz 1979; Morgenthau 1948. To Morgenthau (1948: 202-3) preventive war is a nec-
essary means of balancing the system. To historian A.P. Taylor, “every war between the Great 
Powers [in the 1848-1918 period] started as a preventive war, not a war of conquest.” On preven-
tive war, see also Levy 1987. 
8The “power transition” problem associated with the rise and decline of states is theorized by Or-
ganski 1968; Organski and Kugler 1980; Modelski 1978; Gilpin 1981. Power transition theorists 
view history as a succession of hegemonies, in which one great power after another tries—and 
eventually fails—to dominate the system. While they are at the top, hegemons create a set of po-
litical and economic structures that enhance the stability of the system and advance their own 
economic and security interests. Differential growth and the cost of imperial overextension even-
tually lead to the demise of reigning hegemons and the rise of new challengers. Power transitions 
are seen as dangerous moments in the international system and are often accompanied by con-
flict, instability, security competition, and, frequently, major war. 
9Rationalist models of war start from the premise that, since war is costly and risky and since 
most contests eventually end in some form of settlement that terminates hostilities, rational states 
should have incentives to locate negotiated settlements that they all would prefer to the gamble 
of war. Commitment problems arise because, in conditions of anarchy, even though there may be 
allocations that both sides would prefer to fighting, states cannot credibly promise to follow 
through on agreements. The inability to commit to abiding by agreements is a fundamental cause 
of war (Fearon 1995: 380; Powell 2002, 2006: 169; Gartzke 1991, 2001). For a survey of the formal 
approach to explaining war, see Powell 2006.   8 
Rationalist IR-scholars are generally pessimistic about finding solutions to the 
commitment problem in the absence of third party enforcement (Fearon 1995; Levy 1987; 
Powell 1999). In an anarchical world, they contend, the only lasting solution to the pre-
ventive war dilemma is war. This is too pessimistic. Another possibility is to create an 
institution that enables credible commitment by disabling states’ discretion to renegoti-
ate dispute-ending agreements by force. This section shows three mechanisms—periodic 
power transfers, exchange of hostages and contingent efficiency gains—through which 
such an institution can be configured. 
 
To illustrate the logic of institutional binding, I depict the power transition/pre-
ventive dilemma as a simple two-period game with complete information.10 Two states, 
a rising potential hegemon (H) and a declining state (D) are bargaining about revising 
the status quo. The bargaining can be about any issue—control over territory, access to 
raw materials, possession of nuclear weapons—but is most simply represented in terms 
of a dispute over territory. D may represent a single state or, more realistically, a coali-
tion of states, which for simplicity we assume behaves as a unitary actor. At time t1, H is 
not yet dominant. Since H’s power is growing in relative terms, however, at some point 
in the future, tx, its strength will surpass that of D, meaning that it will be able to prevail 
in all future distributive conflicts. The players’ preferences are represented by the inter-
val [0,1]. H prefers outcomes closer to 1, D closer to 0. The status quo is that H controls 
all territory to the left of q whereas D controls all territory to the right of q. (see Fig. 1 
below).  
 
Imagine that, at both points in time t, H makes a claim X that revises the status 
quo in its favor.11 D can either accept the revision, in which case the game proceeds 
peacefully to the next period, or fight at a cost C. If war ensues, H is expected to win 
(and D to lose) with probability P. Thus, H’s expected payoff from fighting is the ex-
pected value of prevailing in war minus the one-time cost of fighting: Pt(1) + (1-Pt)(0) – C 
= Pt–C and D’s expected payoff is (1-Pt)(0) + Pt(1) = (1−Pt)−C. Following Powell (2002b), 
we may interpret P as the distribution of power between H and D. Note that D’s prob-
ability of victory (1-Pt) decreases in time as a function of its diminishing relative power. 
The pay-offs can be illustrated on a simple horizontal spectrum. 
 
Fig. I The Preventive War Dilemma 
         X1   X2 
              
      UWH=Pi-C UWH=Pii-C  
0  1 
      Q UWD=(1-Pi)-C UWD=(1-Pii)-C  
 
                                                 
10The model presented here provides a simple spatial illustration of the preventive war dilemma 
and the possibilities for negotiated solutions to this dilemma. For a more sophisticated model, see 
author and co-author 2005. For similar depictions of war as a bargaining game, see also Powell 
2002, 2006. 
11We use a “take-it-or-leave-it” bargaining game, which grants all the bargaining advantage to 
the side that makes the initial offer. While this is not a realistic assumption, it involves limited 
loss of generality.   9 
At ti D prefers fighting to accepting any point to the right of (1-Pi)−C. It follows 
that the maximum demand H can make at ti without triggering war is Xi. If H claims Xi, 
a risk-neutral D will be indifferent between waging war and accepting the residual 1-
Xi.12 The catch is that if D accepts 1-Xi in the first period and allows the game to proceed 
peacefully to tii, then sufficient time elapses to allow the power balance to change further 
in favour of H (either as a result of exogenous factors or endogenously as a result of the 
concessions made by D) and spur it to make a second claim (Xii), whose value to D is 
less than its reservation payoff at ti. A D that does not heavily discount the future will 
fight a preventive war at ti to preclude this outcome.13  
 
The Binding Option: In the simple illustration above, preventive war is the best 
strategy for D. But imagine instead that H could agree at ti to a mechanism (hereafter the 
“Institution”) that would allow it to credibly commit not to demand additional conces-
sions in the future. In this case, war would be redundant. We can assume that D would 
refrain from war if it were forever guaranteed its ti reservation payoff. This is the mini-
mum value that the Institution should enable H to guarantee to C in order for C to re-
frain from preventive action. What is needed to secure a peaceful outcome, therefore, is 
an Institution that locks in agreement on Xi by restraining H’s power at tii by the amount 
it has grown since ti, thus forcing it to behave as if the balance had never changed. 
 
The section below explains how institutional binding is possible in practice. But 
before I turn to this question I discuss the specific conditions in which “binding” is likely 
to be preferred to “balancing” (i.e., either alliance-building or armament with a view to 
fighting a preventive war) as a way to counter a rising threat. Given the possibility of 
credible commitment one might believe that, as long as states incur any cost for fighting, 
a negotiated solution at ti will always be preferred to settling the dispute through war 
(see e.g. Fearon 1995; Powell 2006). Yet, this presupposes that a negotiated settlement can 
be obtained at low cost. As we shall see below, institutional binding entails significant 
sovereignty costs. For low generic costs of war, states may therefore prefer to try their 
luck on the battlefield. By contrast, the higher the generic cost of war, the greater the in-
centive to invest in binding institutions facilitating peaceful agreement.14 
                                                 
12Decision makers who are risk-averse will tend to choose the certainty of a negotiated settlement 
that offers them the same value as their average expected utility from war but without the risk of 
fighting. A risk-acceptant decision maker, however, may prefer the gamble of war to the certainty 
of a negotiated settlement. (A risk-acceptant person is defined as a person who prefers playing a 
gamble to receiving its average face value as a certainty. E.g., the person prefers a 50/50 gamble 
for £0 vs. £200 to receiving £100 for sure. A risk-neutral person is indifferent between playing a 
gamble and receiving the gamble’s average face value, while risk-averse player prefers the face 
value to the gamble. See O’Neill 2001: 4-5). The present model assumes that decision makers are 
either risk-averse or risk-neutral.  
13One way of interpreting this condition is that even if H tried to appease D by equating x1 to 
zero, D would still wage a preventive war. This is consistent with some versions of power tran-
sition and preventive war theory. See Levy 1987. 
14One might use a standard measure of offensive/defensive balance as a proxy for this variable, 
so that defensive advantage is associated with high costs of war (from the point of view of the 
initiator) and offensive advantage with lower costs. The implication, namely that D is more likely 
to reject H’s claim and go to war when offense is dominant is consistent with the findings of 
Offense-Defense Theory. ODT posits that factors that increase the ease or reduce the costs of offen-  10 
A second factor that may impact on the choice of binding vs. balancing is the 
availability of external allies. States often enlist external military support to counter a re-
gional threat. If such support is forthcoming and reliable in the long term, balancing 
against a would-be regional hegemon may appear feasible. By contrast, if outside help is 
uncertain or unreliable binding may be more attractive. 
 
A final factor is exogenous threat. Local regional conflicts divert scarce resources 
from other security goals. Since states will usually avoid weakening themselves on sever-
al fronts simultaneously, a third-party threat to a region would increase the appeal of 
binding. Note, however, that according to our model, external threat is not a necessary or 
sufficient condition for binding. The incentive to integrate arises in response to a regional 
security dilemma. Exogenous threat merely facilitates integration by increasing the op-
portunity cost of solving a regional power transition dilemma through war; it does not 
by itself justify integration. (For simplicity, exogenous threat can be thought of simply as 
increasing the expected cost of war.) 
 
To summarize: we expect binding to be preferred to preventive war when one or 
more of the following conditions hold: a) the expected generic costs of war are high; b) 
external allies are unavailable or unreliable, c) there is an external threat to the region, 
which raises the opportunity costs of war. 
 
The Binding Mechanism: Committing to Peace 
 
The above argument should be uncontroversial. If it were possible for states to 
commit to obey dispute-ending agreements then this would remove an important source 
of war. But how is credible commitment possible in practice? To solve the preventive di-
lemma an Institution must perform two tasks: 1) the Institution must resolve future dis-
putes in conformity with the ex ante (i.e. pre-binding) distribution of power, thus pre-
venting future dominant states from using their preponderant resources to prevail in 
distributive conflicts; 2) the Institution must be compulsory. The first condition can be 
met by a contractual decision-rule that apportions formal decision-power among states 
in a way that adjusts for power discrepancies. The second condition requires specific ex-
changes to lock in this contract. 
 
The Decision-Rule  
 
Formally, what is needed to solve a preventive dilemma is an Institution that set-
tles future disputes in accordance with the present power balance. One way to achieve 
this would be to institute a joint decision-making framework that reflects the military 
and economic balance at ti but remains fixed in the face of subsequent fluctuations in the 
underlying distribution of resources. The distribution of “decision-power” within the In-
stitution (defined by a set of voting rules) is set to reflect the power balance at the time 
the Institution becomes effective. Thereafter, all decisions that impact the future decision-
power of members—such as institutional reform, acceptance of new members, etc.—are 
                                                                                                                                                 
sive operations relative to defensive ones generate incentives for preemptive strikes and preven-
tive wars and are also believed to be associated with other war-causing phenomena, such as re-
duced incentives for negotiated conflict resolution (see van Evera 1998; Gortzak, Haftel and 
Sweeney 2002: 67-8).   11 
subjected to unanimity. Day-to-day decisions which do not influence relative power may 
be taken by qualified majority voting with each state disposing of a vote weighted to re-
flect its power at the time of binding (author 2001; author and co-author 2005). 
 
Ensuring Compliance  
 
To achieve credibility is not sufficient for an Institution to limit the formal 
decision-power of stronger states, the Institution must also be binding—i.e., something 
must prevent a rising state from exiting if it no longer wishes to comply. The question of 
how to ensure compliance with international agreements has been the object of extensive 
study. Scholars have proposed two basic answers—one constructivist, one rationalist 
(Checkel 2001). To constructivists, the key to compliance is learning, norm-development 
and trust (e.g. Wendt 1987: 369; Hasenclever et al. 1997: 160; Kupchan 1998). In this view, 
integration among states of uneven strength could be seen to promote peace simply by 
virtue of socializing effects. For example, Kupchan (1998: 42) suggests that conflicts be-
tween a core and periphery can be resolved if the core agrees to subject its power to mul-
tilateral rules and norms. The trust, shared interests and identities built in this way mean 
that peripheral states come to equate their interests and identity with those of the core. 
The problem with this strategy as a solution to power transition conflict is, first, timing. 
The building of shared identities and interests is likely to be a slow task. While a rising 
state may signal its benign intentions by agreeing to exercise its power in accordance 
with multilateral rules and norms, such a gesture is unlikely to subdue the immediate 
fears of declining states. Second, the strategy lacks credibility. In fact, Kupchan acknowl-
edges that cores are likely to “break out” and destroy the regional community through 
“revolution.”  
 
While constructivists stress socialization, rationalists emphasize material incen-
tives to comply. A staple argument of functional regime theory is that international insti-
tutions induce states to cooperate by lowering transaction costs and by supplying sanc-
tioning and reputation mechanisms that heighten the cost of reneging on agreements 
(Keohane 1984; Snyder 1997: 169). Formal, legalized institutions also enable states to 
identify credible types. Because explicit legal commitments are expensive to make and 
implement, and because violation imposes reputation costs on violators, willingness to 
make such commitments identifies one as having a low propensity to defect. Hence, sign-
ing up to formal agreements serves as a costly signal of intent to comply.  
 
The problem with these rationalist commitment mechanisms is that they are not 
ultimately credible. Repeat play and reputation is often enough to prevent reneging on 
low-stake economic issues but may be insufficient to ensure cooperation on sensitive issues 
of national security. When survival is at stake, states heavily discount the future, making 
the one-time gain of reneging more attractive relative to the future opportunities of coop-
eration foregone. Or to put it differently, for a state that perceives its independence to be 
under threat from a rising challenger, the long-term benefits of cooperation are unlikely 
to exceed the immediate benefit of a preventive war. Similarly, a would-be hegemon that 
believes it can reign supreme though war may not be dissuaded by fear of sanctions or 
considerations of lost opportunities for cooperation. To solve a preventive dilemma, 
therefore, an Institution cannot simply rely on sanctions, repeat play and reputation 
mechanisms. Instead, it must enable states to pre-commit to actions that may be time-  12 
inconsistent by removing their discretion to act otherwise. Below, I show three general 
paths to credible commitment.  
 
i. Real Power Adjustment: One way to prevent a rising state from taking advan-
tage of its future military superiority is to make sure that it never acquires superiority. To 
ensure this, states could delegate to an Institution the task of maintaining the ex ante bal-
ance of power by means of control over the allocation of basic resources. Assuming that 
military power is a rough function of economic power and a few strategic resources, an 
Institution could keep power in check simply by transferring asymmetric growth in eco-
nomic and strategic resources between H and D. H would agree, since failing to comply 
would presumably trigger a preventive war before it could translate any additional re-
sources into usable military power. 
 
Resource transfers are an effective way to “freeze” power but entail high sover-
eignty costs. Since what creates the commitment problem is the possibility of future war, 
another solution would be to pool the means of violence. A single army in which na-
tional forces serve under supranational command would limit the ability of individual 
states to resort to violence.15 A similar result could be achieved by engineering military 
interdependence. Cross-country integration of armament industries (with one country 
manufacturing steel, another building tanks, a third planes, etc.) would make national 
militaries functionally dependent on one another. Sharing of equipment and transporta-
tion, coordination of command and control systems, etc. would also make unilateral ac-
tion difficult.  
 
ii. Exit Penalties: A second way to create a self-enforcing bargain is through an 
exit cost that states would have to pay were they to leave the Institution. Exit costs can 
be created through exchanges of “hostages” or through irreversible strategic invest-
ments. For example, a hostage could be created through an exchange of military forces 
or other valuable assets that would be trapped behind enemy lines if conflict broke out. 
Hostages might also take the form of “relation-specific” investments, which were de-
signed to support exchange with a specific partner and would be either lost or greatly 
devalued if cooperation terminated.16 A less radical method would be to pool national 
currencies, thereby increasing the cost of exit by the amount it would cost to print and 
circulate a new currency.  
 
iii. Contingent Efficiency Gains: A third way to achieve binding is to generate ef-
ficiency gains that are contingent on the survival of an Institution. H would agree to be 
bound by an Institution if it generated efficiency gains of the same order as H could 
hope to gain through war and if these gains were strictly contingent on the continuation 
of the Institution. Such gains may result from increased factor productivity. It is well 
known that a reduction in the risk of war favors commerce and foreign investment. 
Power transfers and pooling of military assets, along with creation of a single domestic 
                                                 
15In fact, a common feature of past regional unions has been reliance on common armies not 
mainly to guard against outside threats but also to enforce a union’s treaty base. See author 2001. 
16On the use of “economic hostages” and relation-specific investments to cement cooperation, see 
Williamson 1985; Schelling 1960: 22; North and Weingast 1989. On FDI as a commitment mecha-
nism, see Aizenman 1992.   13 
market, would likely raise productivity.17 Note, however, that efficiency gains of this 
type can only operate as an auxiliary  commitment mechanism, since, to materialize, 
these gains presume a prior diminution in the risk of war. That is, contingent efficiency 
gains as a binding mechanism only become available once other factors (power transfers 
and exit penalties) are in place. 
 
The Relation between Military and Economic Binding 
 
This section has described three general paths through which binding can be 
achieved.18 These rely on both military and economic measures. It may seem that mili-
tary binding mechanisms (such as pooling of armed forces) present the most tangible 
commitment to peaceful cooperation. If states surrender control of their independent 
militaries, the ability to settle disputes by force is clearly curtailed. Yet, national power 
depends on economic as well as military resources. To build military establishments ca-
pable of defending vital national interests states must draw resources out of the national 
economy and employ them in the security sector. Economic and military binding there-
fore reinforce each other. The purpose of military binding is to ensure that force cannot 
be used in pursuit of political objectives. Economic binding reinforces military binding 
by balancing growth and increasing costs of exit. However, economic and military bind-
ing may also substitute for one another. The failure to achieve firm military binding 
through a pooling of armed forces increases the strategic importance of economic bind-
ing since the potential for translating economic into military resources will appear more 
dangerous. 
 
Observable Implications 
 
The institutional binding theory generates distinct observable implications with 
respect both to the timing and form of integration. First, if the theory is correct we expect 
integration to coincide with a regional power transition rather than a) an exogenous in-
crease in opportunities for regional trade and investment (as liberals predict) or b) an in-
stance of regional hegemony in which a dominant state funds and enforces cooperation 
(as the hegemonic stability theory predicts). The theory predicts that integration is most 
likely as a response to an impending power transition when: a) the generic costs of war 
are high, b) external allies are unavailable or undependable, c) there is an external threat 
to a region, which raises the opportunity costs of war. 
                                                 
17The idea that an anticipated loss of gains from trade or other forms of economic cooperation 
has a pacifying effect on states is closely aligned with the predictions of liberal institutionalism. A 
vast literature explores the theme that economic interdependence reduces the likelihood of mili-
tarized conflict. Yet, empirical evidence for the “commercial-peace” thesis is ambiguous. While 
some scholars find that trade is associated with peace, others find it induces conflict. An explana-
tion might be that productivity gains per se have a limited pacifying effect, but work only in con-
junction with other factors that also lower risk of war. 
18The three “paths” to binding explored in this section represent ideal-types. The specific mecha-
nisms that deliver binding will differ from case to case, depending on historical context. E.g. 
practicable arrangements for constraining military force may vary according to technological de-
velopment and geography. Similarly, what constitutes an effective economic hostage may differ 
from one state to another depending on opportunity costs.   14 
Second, the theory predicts that regional institutions will establish a political bal-
ance of influence among members that roughly reflects the military balance at the time of 
binding. This political balance is reinforced by redistributive transfers and pooling of 
strategic resources, exit-penalties, and contingent efficiency gains. 
 
In general, the binding theory predicts that security concerns will be a main con-
cern for integrating states. Although integration is expected to involve economic and 
functional cooperation, the theory posits that security concerns will engender and shape 
economic cooperation, not vice-versa.  
 
Below I evaluate these predictions against evidence from two cases of integration. 
But first, let me briefly discuss the reliability of the findings. Given the theoretical prem-
ise, the universe of relevant cases in principle includes all instances of regional power 
transition. Yet, since not all power transitions are expected to result in integration, a ran-
dom selection of cases from the universe of power transitions would not be feasible in a 
study of this length.19 I have therefore selected two cases in which integration has in fact 
occurred in order to examine whether the decision to integrate can be causally linked to 
the presence of the independent and intervening factors identified above. To what extent 
should the reader be persuaded by evidence drawn from two cases that are admittedly 
selected on the dependent variable? The case analysis presented below does not consti-
tute a complete test20 of the institutional binding theory. However, the analysis adheres 
to three methodological principles, which ought to strengthen confidence in the findings. 
First, rather than simply record correlation between independent and dependent factors, 
each case study presents a detailed narrative that reveals the mechanisms through which 
independent and intervening factors caused the dependent outcome. Second, the hypo-
theses are evaluated against competing explanations rather than the null-hypothesis. 
Third, to increase confidence in the findings, case narratives are based on a broad array 
of sources, including “hard” primary sources (internal government reports and diary en-
tries), “soft” primary sources (newspaper reports, public statements, political memoirs), 
and secondary material.  
 
III. CASES OF INSTITUTIONAL BINDING 
 
3.i The European Communities as “Institutional Binding” 
 
Introduction 
  On May 9, 1950, less than five years after France’s liberation from German occu-
pation, French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, proposed to place the entire Franco-
                                                 
19One could, of course, narrow the universe of cases to instances of power transition in which 
states are judged to be risk-averse and in which the generic costs of war are judged to be high in 
order to check whether integration follows. However, since a coding of all such cases would be 
associated with some difficulty, I have chosen the more straightforward (and less reliable) meth-
od of looking at known cases of integration to see whether a causal link can be established be-
tween our hypothesized independent and intervening variables and the dependent outcome.  
20A reliable test would either rely on a random case selection from a universe of cases of power 
transitions or include one or more “control cases” in which a regional power transition was not 
associated with integration in order to confirm the absence of our hypothesized intervening vari-
ables.   15 
German production of coal and steel under the authority of a supranational institution. 
Pooling French and German heavy industry interests, he argued, would be the first step 
towards a fully integrated Europe that would make war between the two former antago-
nists “not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.” The Schuman Plan was the 
first in a series of constitutive bargains among West European governments that resulted, 
first, in the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 and culmi-
nated, some forty years later, in the signing of a Treaty on European Union.  
 
What were the underlying motivations for the steps taken after 1950 towards 
“ever closer union” among West European governments? While the process of European 
integration has been handmaiden to numerous and complex interests—including promoti-
ng economic growth, balancing against the Soviet threat and yielding to pressure by the 
American hegemon—I submit that integration can be principally explained by a desire to 
forestall German domination in Europe. World War II, like World War I, failed to solve 
the problem of German ascendancy. In the wake of the war, France and its allies, having 
fought two large-scale wars to fend off German hegemony, found themselves temporar-
ily more powerful than their vanquished enemy. Yet, they knew this advantage was un-
likely to last. The new West German state that emerged out of the ruins of the Third 
Reich in 1949 had only half the area of Germany of 1937 but possessed three quarters of 
its population and the bulk of its industrial strength. While militarily defeated, Germany 
still had the potential to become the strongest European state economically, demographi-
cally and militarily. The problem afforded two possible solutions: either prevent Ger-
many from ever growing militarily powerful again by curbing its potential for growth; or 
devise an institution that would allow Germany to commit not to bully its neighbors in 
the future. 
 
  The French first tried a punitive strategy. The goal was to neutralize German 
warmaking potential by curbing its heavy industry output (Dinan 1994: 21; Milward 
1984: 492). The so-called Monnet Plan of 1946 called on the Allied powers to limit Ger-
man steel output and to allocate a share (about twenty million tons a year for twenty 
years) of coal output from the Ruhr to France, thereby boosting French recovery while at 
the same time stunting the development of a fuel-starved German steel industry.21 Yet, 
French decision makers gradually came to favor the second solution. The reasons were 
twofold. First, to revive its sluggish economy, France depended on supplies of coal and 
coke from the Ruhr. This dependence raised doubts about the long-term feasibility of 
curtailing German industrial output (Gillingham 1991: 207-8; Willis 1968: 90; Pounds & 
Parker 1957: 339; Lynch 1984: 235). Second, the onset of the Cold War meant that puni-
tive measures collided with the confrontation between the superpowers. As the Cold 
War took hold, France’s principal external allies, Britain and the U.S., insisted on lifting 
economic and military constraints on West Germany in order to enlist her help in the al-
lied defense against the Soviet threat. Realizing that balancing would be both costly and 
unlikely to succeed, France and her neighbors abandoned punitive designs in favor of a 
policy of institutional binding designed to impose institutional constraints on German 
power while she was still relatively weak. The regional organizations that were created in 
the early postwar years—ECSC, WEU, EEC, and Euratom—all bear mark of this goal.  
 
                                                 
21A.N. F60/902: Note from Ministry of Finance, March 10, 1946. See also Lynch 1984: 236-9.   16 
The Schuman Plan 
The first step towards binding German power was the Schuman Plan of 1950. By 
1949 it stood clear that the French Monnet Plan was inconsistent with American concep-
tions of West Germany’s role in an allied defense. Washington had demanded already in 
May 1947 that German coal and steel output be increased to match the French level,22 and 
by 1949 German steel output crept above France’s for the first time since the war (Stirk 
and Weigall 1992: 63). It was clear that a preventive policy aiming at crippling German 
power potential was no more realistic now than it had been in 1919. As Schuman ob-
served, 
 
In 1945 there was still a strong effort to stick to the former policy of 
force: Germany was without a government due to the total collapse of its 
cadres and institutions and therefore powerless. Should one, must one not 
under such circumstances seize the opportunity to create a new Germany, to 
give it a structure that would afford protection against the re-emergence of 
such a big and dangerous power? Let us not forget that the imposed consti-
tution and institutions, which were introduced in hostile ammunition wag-
ons have no prospects of lasting… I have already referred to the failure of the 
laws of 1871 and 1919. A policy imposed by the victor can only create fragile 
and deceptive solutions; it is a source for new conflicts. A peace whose single 
basis is mutual concessions cannot for long withstand a new shift of power between 
the opponents (1964: 124-5—my emphasis). 
 
Schuman distrusted standard balance-of-power logic. If two victorious wars 
could not prevent Germany from threatening its neighbors again, no war or punitive re-
strictions in the future would. The French Government thus reversed tactics and set to 
work on a plan for industrial cooperation that would allow the restoration of German 
power “within limits and according to a rhythm which will put aside any threat of hege-
mony dangerous to the peace of Europe” (Schuman 1949). The motivation behind this 
shift in strategy is illustration by the memo sent by Jean Monnet to Robert Schuman and 
George Bidault in early May 1950: 
 
The German situation is rapidly becoming a dangerous cancer for 
peace in the near future, and for France at once…Germany is already asking 
to increase its steel production from 11 to 14 million tonnes. We will refuse, 
but the Americans will insist. In the end we will, with some reservations, give 
way…If France does not speak and act now, what will happen? A group will 
form around the United States, but in order to wage the Cold War with 
greater force. The obvious reason is that the countries of Europe are afraid 
and are seeking help. Britain will draw closer to the United States; Germany 
                                                 
22See Mowat 1973. The French desire to permanently fix Germany’s productive capacity was 
now described in Washington as “suffering from a time lag.” See Statements of Douglas, May 
1918 (FRUS 1948/II:155; FRUS 1948/II:230-1) and statement of military Governor for Germany, 
General Clay (FRUS 1948/II:110). See also Poidevin 1991: 333-4; Gillingham 1991:  149, 162; 
Archer 1990: 20.   17 
will develop rapidly, and we shall not be able to prevent her being re-
armed.23 
 
A few days later, on May 9, Schuman announced his Government’s plan for 
merging French and German coal and steel production under a common institution that 
would be open to participation by other European countries. The stated goal was to “pre-
vent Germany from once again using the Ruhr district’s industrial strength to support ag-
gression” but “to employ the areas resources for the benefit of Europe as a whole.”  
 
Some might accuse Schuman of using clever rhetoric to reconcile the French need 
for German raw materials with lofty appeals to European peace. Yet, when we examine 
the details surrounding the launch and reception of the Schuman Plan we find clear evi-
dence that the plan was intended to improve French security by constraining German 
military potential. Coal and steel were the sinews of any war machine, and it was widely 
believed that no country could wage war without an independent coal and steel industry 
(Archer 1990: 54; Dell 1995: 15; Milward 1984: 392-195; Gillingham 1991: 45-6).24 The 
majority in the Parliament thus readily accepted the view of Alfred Coste-Fleuret, 
 
Germany is in full growth, but this is a growth, which has never 
stopped. It is precisely at the moment when we could conceive some fears 
about this development, that the Schuman Plan intervenes opportunely to 
stabilize the situation and to take from the German state, as it does from 
the French, the disposition over their heavy industry for war-purposes.25 
 
The Schuman Plan arose from a unique combination of weakness and strength. 
While their belated victory in World War II had temporarily granted the French an upper 
hand vis-à-vis Germany, Germany still posed a potential threat to French security. French 
dependence on German industrial output, combined with the apparent willingness on the 
part of the U.S.A and Britain to lift constraints on German steel production and, ultimate-
ly, on rearmament, reinforced this threat and underscored the inadequacies of traditional-
ly conceived alliances to tackle the post-1945 situation. The French, of course, were not 
alone in this predicament. Economic ruin and acute awareness of incapacity in the event 
of renewed German aggression were common to many European countries, expect for the 
few small states that had escaped the wrath of the war. At the 1948 conference on “Ger-
man Problems” held in London, the Benelux had jointly stressed the need to prevent a fu-
ture German threat while keeping the German economy strong. This, they argued, could 
best be secured through “de-concentrating” German economic and political power and in-
corporating it into a framework for European integration.26 The Dutch Foreign Ministry 
now argued that: “[F]rom the political point of view, [the Schuman Plan] must be ac-
                                                 
23Cited in Salmon and Nicoll 1997: 41-3. 
24Some have questioned the pacifying effects of the ECSC by pointing out that, in 1952, changing 
technology had already begun to consign heavy industry struggles to irrelevance in war. Yet, as 
Gillingham (1991: 360) notes, “there were too few atomic bombs after 1945 to have transformed 
the nature of warfare overnight; military planning in both East and West assumed that the next 
war in Europe…would be fought …with ground forces as the decisive element of battle.” 
25Quoted in Grosser 195: 65. 
26FRUS 1948/II, 26 Feb:155; and FRUS 1948/II, 29 Feb.   18 
claimed vociferously, because it creates the capability for Europe to profit by Germany’s 
strength without being threatened by it.”27 
 
The German reaction was also positive. Keenly aware of the depth of international 
fear and mistrust toward the Federal Republic, Adenauer understood that shared sover-
eignty pointed the only way to international rehabilitation (Adenauer 1965: 328). In No-
vember 1949 Adenauer had himself suggested that France be allowed to invest in Ger-
man steel production in order to relieve fears of German war-making potential.28 From a 
German perspective the attraction of the Schuman Plan was that it promised to lift Allied 
restrictions on German steel production and to abolish the International Ruhr Authority.29 
While critics protested that by agreeing to ECSC, Germany would irrevocably surrender 
control of its economy (Diebold 1959: 99; Baade 1951: 22), Adenauer welcomed the treaty 
as a way to regain political autonomy at the price of relinquishing the Ruhr’s role as the 
epicenter of European heavy industry. 
 
In the end, only Britain remained sceptical. Prime Minister Ernst Bevin categori-
cally refused participation in a coal and steel pool that entailed a principled commitment 
to supranationalism. In the event of war with the Soviet Union, he contended, London 
would have to assume that West Europe would be quickly overrun and that Britain, 
alone among European states, would be fighting alongside America. No arrangement 
could therefore be made that could undermine an independent British defense effort 
(Bullen 1989: 202). London also feared that ECSC would weaken Atlantic ties (Charlton 
1983: 162; Nutting 1966: 4; Dinan 1994: 25). Both Labour and the Conservatives believed 
that without help from the United States it would be impossible to contain Germany and 
set Europe on its feet economically. For this reason, Germany had to be integrated into a 
larger Atlantic Community rather than embedded in exclusively European structures.30 It 
is important to note that the British objection was rooted not in economic concerns, but 
rather in hostility to the geopolitical vision underlying the Schuman Plan. British coal 
and steel production was highly efficient and stood to gain from liberalization of Euro-
pean coal and steel markets. It is unlikely that the British government would have op-
posed the ECSC had it merely aimed to liberalize trade in coal and steel. In fact, in August 
1950, British Conservatives proposed a looser, intergovernmental framework for coordi-
nating coal and steel production under the aegis of the Council of Europe, thus under-
scoring Britain’s commitment to freeing industrial trade. This plan, however, was rejected 
by France on the grounds that what Europe needed was not merely economic coopera-
tion but “a fusion of political interests” (see Macmillan 1969: 204). 
                                                 
27Kersten, 286-7 and FRUS 1948/II, Feb. 26; FRUS 1948/II, Feb. 29. See also U.S. Senate, Foreign 
Relations Committee, June 1953: 37.  
28This proposal was made in an interview to the Baltimore Sun. See Schmidt 1997: 81; Adenauer 
1965: 254-60, 311-5. In March 1950 in an interview with American journalist, Kingsburry-Smith, 
Adenauer proposed uniting France, Germany and the Benelux states in a customs union as a way 
to end their rivalry.  
29The Bundesrat’s approval of the ECSC was made conditional on assurances from the occupy-
ing powers that when the ECSC became operative, the IAR would be eliminated and restrictions 
on steel production lifted. See Spierenburg and Poidevin 1994: 21. 
30Bullen 1989: 201-3; “Documents of British policy Overseas,” s. II, vol. 1, 1986; FRUS/1948/ 
II:12, 61; Fursdon 1980: 61.   19 
ECSC as a Case of Binding 
Was ECSC a case of “institutional binding”? The institutional binding theory pre-
dicts that integration will serve to “freeze” the balance of power among members at the 
point of binding. Arguably, West Germany had no army and was under occupation; 
hence there was no “balance” to freeze. However, as the Cold War took hold, it became 
increasingly clear that the Americans and British would eventually favor lifting con-
straints on Germany as a means to reinforce balancing against the USSR , thus unleashing 
Germany’s potential for growth. This led to a perception on the part of France and her 
continental allies that one must act to bind Germany now, while she was still in a rela-
tively weak position. 
 
The ECSC took several steps to constrain German power. The treaty institutional-
ized three groups of powers: large (France, Germany, Italy); medium (Belgium and Hol-
land); and small (Luxembourg) and established a principle of equal vote allocations for 
states within each group regardless of variations in underlying power. This principle has 
been a cornerstone of European institutions ever since.31 Because of this principle, Ger-
many’s “institutional power” has continued to move further away from its “real” power 
as measured in GDP and population. In 1952, German decision-power was 9 percent be-
low its actual power (calculated in GDP); by 1995, the gap had widened to 16 percent.32 
 
As the binding theory predicts, the equalization of political power within the 
ECSC was made binding through a series of specific bargains. The Paris treaty tasked the 
High Authority (HA) with maintaining a rough balance between members’ industrial 
growth through reallocating industrial resources (Hogan 1991, 169). The HA ordered 
Germany to decartelize the Ruhr33 and designed transfer-mechanisms through which 
“efficient producers” (i.e., Germany) would compensate less efficient ones (France, Italy 
and Belgium).34 In addition, the treaty granted the HA a veto over all industrial mergers 
as well as new investment programs as a way to prevent concentration of industrial 
power in one country.35 These measures, which effectively led to a redistribution of in-
dustrial power from Germany to other states, amounted to a system of “real power ad-
justment” whereby Germany surrendered the fruits of her natural advantage in raw ma-
terials. This bargain was reinforced through contingent efficiency gains stemming from 
                                                 
31Successive enlargements have created new groups, but relative votes in the group of large 
powers have remained unchanged. The 2000 Nice Summit, which raised the issue of readjusting 
voting weights, did not chance this reality. See author and co-author 2001. 
32See author and co-author 2005. 
33The treaty called upon the FRG to eliminate the Deutsche Kohlen Verkauf. See Blondeel 1953: 
10-1; Diebold 1959: 96-7; Gillingham 1991: 424-5. 
34The so-called Hirsch-Vinck Plan called upon the FRG to pay 3,000 million Belgian Francs over 
five years to subsidize wages and new investments in Belgium. Italy secured extensive German 
subsidies for its new steel mills, and France was allowed to reduce its output at a slower rate than 
Germany (Bondeel 1952: 70; Diebold 1959: 96-7; Lutches 1951: 70; Mason 1955: 55-6; Gillingham 
1991: 248, 400-1). 
35Paris Treaty, Section 66. See Bondell 1953, 13. The HA’s powers to veto financing gave it strong 
leverage over German industry since the largely demobilized German mines and mills required 
considerable outside investment, which was subject to approval by the HA. See Mason 1955: 56.   20 
rationalization of production and removal of customs and duties related to trade in in-
dustrial products.  
 
To be sure, the ECSC also tackled a pressing economic problem. To rebuild their 
devastated economies, European countries demanded a steady stream of inexpensive 
coal and steel. An international market for coal and steel would heighten competition and 
rationalize production. It is clear, however, that the principal value of the plan was politi-
cal rather than industrial. In drafting the plan, Schuman acted with great discretion to side-
step objections from French industry (Spierenburg & Poidevin 1991: 5; JM MAG 18/4/2, 
Aubrun to Monnet, 05-08-1950). None of the major industrial groups were consulted at 
the drafting stage or represented at the negotiations. When the proposal was made pub-
lic, French industrialists overwhelmingly opposed it (Eillis 1968: 94). Beginning in July 
1950, the Steel syndicate and the steel industry’s employer organization, the Conseil Natio-
nal du Patronat Français, whipped up opposition to the Schuman Plan and “by the end of 
the year, protests of were registered by nearly every chamber of commerce in France” (see 
Mason 1955: 3; Gillingham 1991: 237).  
 
That purely economic interests were not the driving force for the ECSC is also 
demonstrated by the rejection of the British proposal for an intergovernmental frame-
work coal and steel union. Like the ECSC this proposal would have lifted constraints on 
imports and exports but would not have had the same restraining effect on war-making 
capacity, since it would not grant a supranational body powers to supervise and limit 
excess production.  
 
EDC 
The next proposal for integration was the French Pleven Plan for a European De-
fense Community (EDC), which was launched in October 1950 and led to four years of in-
tense negotiations before it was definitively buried by the French National Assembly’s re-
jection of the treaty in August 1954. Given its failure, the EDC has received less attention 
from students of European integration, who see the unsuccessful project as confirmation 
that security concerns have played a secondary role in the integration process. Yet, this 
conclusion ignores the fact that intense negotiations over a common army went on for four 
years, and that four countries—Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany—ratified 
the EDC, while a fifth, Italy, seemed willing to do so as well. How do we explain the readi-
ness of these countries to pool control over their national armies? And why, in the end, did 
the project fail? 
 
The concrete occasion for the Pleven Plan was the American demand in September 
1950 that West Germany be allowed to contribute ten divisions to an integrated Allied de-
fense within NATO. The consensus among the Allies until 1950 had been that restitution of 
German political and military sovereignty should happen gradually. The Korean War, 
however, challenged this consensus. Dean Acheson recalls in his memoirs,  
 
the idea that Germany’s place in the defence of Europe would be 
worked out by a process of evolution was outmoded. Korea had speeded 
up evolution…The real question was not whether Germany should be 
brought into a general European defence system but whether this could be   21 
done without disrupting everything else we were doing and giving Ger-
many the key position in the balancing of power in Europe (1969: 437). 
 
According to George Ball, who was with Monnet on the day of the North Korean 
invasion, Monnet realized immediately that Washington would now demand German rear-
mament (Ball 1982: 90-1, Monnet 1978: 401). To prevent the reemergence of an inde-
pendent German army, Monnet and his colleagues set to work on a proposal for a European 
Defense Community, which would facilitate the “complete merger of men and equipment 
under a single European political and military authority” with a common defence budget. 
The EDC would be governed by a central authority, which would command the common 
army as well as coordinate foreign, economic and monetary policy (Fursdon 1980: 340-1). 
German troops would serve in small contingents and be integrated “at the level of the 
smallest possible unit” (a battalion). Coste-Fleuret in his appeal to the French Assembly to 
accept the treaty, argued: “We know that the two sources of power of modern Germany in 
recent times are the Ruhr arsenal (to neutralize it we have constructed the CECA [ECSC]) 
and the national Germany army, which we also want to neutralize by integrating German 
soldiers into the discipline of a supranational army” (Grosser 1957: 66). 
 
EDC as a Case of Binding? 
The French vision of a European army was never realized. The parties spent four 
years drafting a treaty only to see it rejected by the French Assembly in August 1954. If 
EDC  was devised to constrain German military power, why did Paris reject it? The 
French rebuff was rooted in several grievances about the final treaty, which made it a 
less capable of containing German power. As proposed by Pleven, the EDC would have 
provided for a sweeping surrender of military sovereignty to a supranational authority; 
German troops were to be recruited and armed not by the Bonn government but by a su-
pranational European authority. They would be welded into a highly integrated Euro-
pean army. During the negotiations, in accordance with the expectations of the binding 
theory, France also succeeded in “freezing” the scales of political power by demanding 
that French voting power in the Council would be matched at all times with Germany, 
regardless of how many troops either country contributed to the EDC (Fursdon 1980: 
206-8; Nutting 1966: 48, 60; Dockril 1991: 115). This all amounted to an intricate system 
for binding German military power. As the negotiations proceeded, however, safe-
guards against German revisionism were watered down. In his original plan (which 
passed the French Assembly with 343 to 225 votes) Pleven had opposed the creation of 
national “divisions”—the smallest military unit capable of independent manoeuvre—
and proposed “batallions” of 5000 men, which would be “fused” into the common army. 
In the final treaty the basic national unit would be the “groupement” consisting of 13,000 
men. This meant that there would be independent German divisions.36 Another weak-
ness was the lack of British participation, which sparked fear in Paris that a rearmed 
Germany would dominate the Community (Fursdon 1980: 261; Dockril 1991: 107; Nut-
ting 1966; Charlton 1983: 162; Kolodziej 1974: 259). During the negotiations, France and 
the Benelux countries repeatedly called on Britain to join EDC. They also sought to obtain 
a guarantee that Britain would intervene militarily should Germany try to withdraw 
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from EDC.37 London categorically refused: “We cannot afford to allow the European fed-
eral concept to gain a foothold within NATO and thus weaken instead of strengthening 
the ties between the countries on the two sides of the Atlantic,” said Bevin, “we must nip 
it in the bud” (cited in Trachtenberg 1999: 117). Macmillan went further calling EDC a 
“cancer in the Atlantic body.”38 To Britain EDC blatantly failed to satisfy its priority of 
fighting the Cold War. As Macmillan (1969: 220) rightly observed, “it was apparent that 
this scheme [EDC] was more calculated to alleviate the fear of the French than to strike 
terror into the Russians.” This view was confirmed by Fursdon (1980: 255-7), who ob-
served that “the real issue which would determine ratification, was whether, in French 
eyes [the EDC] marked any advance in political guarantees against German hegemony 
rather than military guarantees against Soviet aggression.”39 
 
The final debate in the French Assembly on August 29 confirms that EDC failed, 
not because it entailed a too far-reaching surrender of sovereignty, but rather because it 
was not far-reaching enough. Both proponents and opponents based their arguments on 
security against Germany. EDC partisans stressed the dangers of independent German 
rearmament; “EDC or the Wehrmacht” was their slogan. Opponents countered by argu-
ing against German rearmament under any form (Aron & Lerner 1957: 13; Willis 1968: 
98).  
 
The lack of British participation was also held up as a weakness (see Charlton 
1983: 162; Dockrill 1991: 107). Mr. Herriot argued before the Assembly, “... I have read 
the texts with anguish. There is nothing in them to show that Britain would be at our side 
to resist the strength and any eventual maneuvers of Germany. Britain must be at the side 
of France in this matter to act with equal responsibility in the face of a new German threat, 
should it arise. “ 
 
When the final vote was taken on August 30, 1954, EDC was defeated by a vote of 
319 to 264. In rejecting the treaty, however, France operated with a safety net. Premier 
Mendes-France knew that alternative plans were being made in London for incorpor-
ating Germany into NATO via an intermediary European framework (see Dockrill 1991: 
110; Fursdon 1980: 292-93; Charlton 1983: 163). In September 1954, Eden announced a 
“British package,” which would let West Germany enter NATO by signing a strengthened 
Brussels Treaty Organization of 1948. The new scheme—the Western European Union—
would not be supranational, but would nonetheless institute safeguards against a re-
armed Germany, including a cap on the total number of German troops, which could not 
be exceeded without unanimous approval by the WEU Council (i.e., a French veto). Allied 
forces would remain stationed in Germany not only as protection against the Soviet Un-
ion, but also as a reassurance against future German aggression.40 According to Trach-
tenberg (1999: 127-8),  
 
                                                 
37Trachtenberg 1999: 118; FRUS 1952-54, 5:10, 12-3, 41-3, 46-7, 78-9, 682, 687; Acheson 1969: 615. 
38DO(50)100, PREM 8/1429 and speech to the House of Commons, 29-11-1950. 
39Adenauer (1965: 345) wrote in this memoirs: “the Western Allies, especially France, had to 
find an answer to the question of which was the greater danger, the threat from the Soviet 
Union or a German contribution to a EDC .” 
40Declaration by the FRG and the three western powers, 3 Oct. 1954, FRUS 1952-54, 5: 1352-1354.   23 
all this—the strengthened NATO  structure, the western military 
presence on German soil, the reserved rights, the limits on German mili-
tary power—added up to a system. Germany was to be tied to the West… 
but her freedom of action was to be curtailed and she was not to have the 
same sovereign rights as the other western powers.” 
 
EEC  
The vision of European integration as an instrument to pacify Germany did not 
die with the rejection of EDC but underpinned successive attempts at integration. The 
Benelux plan for a European Economic Community explicitly aimed to tie down German 
economic power and to bind Germany to the Community via efficiency gains. By 1953, 
West German national income was more than double that of France and made up 48.6 
percent of the ECSC total (Gillingham 1991: 357). What seemed unavoidable in the future, 
in a way that military preponderance no longer did, was the economic primacy of Ger-
many in Europe—a primacy that might lessen Bonn’s dependence on Europe and lead to 
a more independent foreign policy (see Milward 1992: 119-20; Mowat 1973: 129-35; 
Mayne 1973: 231). To the Benelux governments what was needed was a binding, step-by-
step approach to economic union that would pull the FRG into a European community 
and grant other states influence over its economic policies (Milward 1992: 119-20). Refer-
ring to the EEC, Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, wrote to Eden in February 
1956:  
 
…this I believe is the real way to solve the German problem. A Germany 
which is integrated in European entities, and through them, in the Atlantic Pact, 
will have defended herself against an individualism that too rapidly takes the 
form of nationalism, whose effects we know, and at the same time against the 
temptation to approach the Russians by herself …To this political conception are 
added some economic considerations… It seems clear to me that in this field the 
future belongs to the large communities of mankind. Automation, the progress of 
technology, the increase of production and productivity—all…require large mar-
kets (Quoted in Mayne 1973: 251). 
 
The creation of the EEC led to significant economic gains for its members. Yet, as 
with other integration initiatives, the Common Market cannot be explained solely as a re-
sult of pressure from economic interests. Both the French and German Foreign Ministries 
avoided any general consultation of economic interest groups (Milward 1992: 198, 208). 
In France, organized industry was generally ill disposed towards the EEC (Milward 1992: 
208; Charlton 1983: 205). In July 1956, in response to a British proposal to create an in-
dustrial FTA embracing all the OEEC countries,41 business representatives in the French 
Economic and Social Council voted unanimously to relocate the EEC talks to the OEEC 
(Parsons 2001: 8). German opinion was also divided. On one hand, the large competitive 
German industries stood to gain from regional trade liberalization. On the other hand, 
Germany’s dependence on markets outside Europe meant that an exclusive European 
customs union might be harmful to the German economy (see Kolodziej 1974: 277; Mo-
ravcsik 1998: 95-7; Calleo 1978: 162-66). The German preference was thus for multilateral 
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as well as regional trade liberalization (Moravcsik 1998, 88-9). German Minister of Eco-
nomics, Ludwig Erhard, virulently attacked EEC for “constraining German industry with-
in a continental dimension” (Ludlow 1997: 27). He was supported by the most influential 
of German economic interest groups, the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie.42 Yet, 
when Erhard tried in October 1956 to persuade the German Cabinet to suspend the EEC 
negotiations in favor of the British OEEC scheme, he was overruled by Adenauer and 
Hallstein, who insisted EEC had to be privileged for political reasons.43 
 
The EEC reinforced the security bargain that was reached with the ECSC through 
both exit costs and efficiency gains. During the first four years of its existence (1958-62), 
Franco-German trade tripled. The freeing of capital flows within the EEC also brought 
about an extraordinary acceleration of FDI and opening of subsidiaries abroad. The Com-
mon Market thus helped to bring about the tight interlocking of economic interests that 
both Schuman and Adenauer had envisaged in 1950 but that the ECSC had not succeeded 
in creating through spill-over effects (Willis 1968: 100). As such EEC completed the bind-
ing process that was begun six years early with the signing of the ECSC treaty.  
 
Objections and Further Observations 
I have suggested that integration in postwar Europe was motivated by a regional 
power transition dilemma. Yet, one might object by asking: if integration in Europe was 
designed to constrain German power with a view to preventing another intra-European 
war, then why was it not tried at the turn of the century or during the interwar period? 
After all, France in the wake of World War I faced a security dilemma similar to the one 
it faced after World War II. It is well known that—alongside hopes of using coercion to 
enforce the Versailles treaty—the French government after World War I also explored 
strategies for economic integration with Germany (see Trachtenberg 1979: 26-9; McDou-
gall 1989: 9-11). Briand’s proposal for economic union in 1929 is indicative of this effort. 
Briand’s proposal, however, came just as the rise of the Nazis made such a visionary 
scheme seem impossible. Schuman’s proposal, by contrast, was realized because of a fa-
vorable constellation of circumstances: first, Soviet threat made European cooperation 
imperative as other countries felt a need to involve Germany in the defence of Europe. 
This increased the opportunity cost to internal conflict. Second, the American presence in 
Europe made binding appear less risky to Germany’s neighbors.44 Germany, for its part, 
faced an immediate threat from the East and was eager to obtain the trust and coopera-
tion of its neighbors to allow it to rebuild its strength more quickly. Thus, the expected 
cost of intra-regional conflict was high to all involved, whereas binding appeared more 
attractive. While favorable, however, this was not a “unique constellation” of circum-
stances, as many scholars have claimed. As we shall see below, similar circumstances ob-
                                                 
42At the same time, the EEC was also attacked by protectionist groups like the Deutsche Bauern-
verband who feared agreement on a common agricultural policy would be harmful to them. 
43Ludlow 1997: 27. Adenauer‘s policy directions to the German Ministers on January 19, 1956, 
read: “the Messina initiative must be seen as a step towards the creation of a community that 
will secure the right direction of political will and action—in the interest of a future reunifi-
cation.“ Adenauer 1985 (vol. II): 253-35. 
44While I have not included any objective measure of this, I think it is reasonable to argue that 
European political elites after the war were generally risk-averse. Certainly the war had amply 
demonstrated the pitfalls and unpredictability of armed conflict.   25 
tained in nineteenth-century Germany, where Austria provided a temporary, but ulti-
mately unreliable, external check on Prussian power, thereby allowing other German 
states to bind it as it rose. 
 
A second possible objection concerns preferences for centralization. Germany at 
various points has pushed for a more federal Europe, whereas France has insisted on a 
Europe without federal institutions and without strong political legitimacy. How do we 
reconcile this with a French wish to bind German power? Here we need to recall that the 
aim of binding is to safeguard state sovereignty, not to replace it with central govern-
ment. It is not surprising to see a demographically dominant country push for greater 
centralization of institutions; substituting majoritarian elections for the intergovernmen-
tal system of veto points would increase German influence on policymaking. However, 
from the perspective of other European states, such an outcome would put them at an 
obvious disadvantage. Institutional binding accounts for exactly this outcome.45 
  
Postwar European integration has instituted a political balance of power among 
Member States, which has been rendered credible through pooling and redistribution of 
power as well as exit penalties and efficiency gains. As such it has provided a credible as-
surance against the hegemony of Germany. The question is: why has Germany agreed to 
this series of binding designs? One answer is “timing.” The rudimentary steps towards in-
tegration were launched at a time when Germany, although economically recuperating, 
was still politically and militarily fragile. Divided and occupied, and subject to a significant 
threat from the East, the principal goal of the FRG was to reclaim political sovereignty and 
gain the right to rebuild a national defense. Bonn realized, however, that political and mili-
tary equality could be acquired only at the expense of institutional restraints on German 
power. When Germany after 1945 agreed to let the elements of sovereignty that were being 
restored to it be immediately “frozen” in the international organizations it joined—as in 
the case of the ECSC, WEU, EEC, OEEC, and NATO—the primary payoff to Germany was in 
terms of equality rather than of independence (Hanrieder 1980: 17).  
 
A second answer lies in changing German preferences. Postwar Germany—like 
other European states—has drawn lessons from history that have served to change its per-
ception of war as a feasible means of obtaining either security or wealth. As the strongest 
and most dynamic of the West European economies, and as the country with the greatest 
export potential, Germany has benefited significantly from integration—its growing trade 
surpluses far outweighing the cost of its large direct budgetary contribution.46 European 
integration has given Germany a home market with sufficient scales to foster industries 
that are competitive in the world economy. Thus, in purely economic terms it may well be 
true that Germany has gained more from being immured in the EC than it might have won 
by attempting to coerce its neighbours under its exclusive leadership (Hanrieder 1980: 11).  
 
Yet, while the desire to garner commercial advantages has been an important 
force in shaping integration and in sustaining support for the European project, econom-
                                                 
45I.e. the Bavarian government had more influence under the German confederation than under 
the German Empire when they were relegated to the status of a local government. 
46In 1996, Germany’s financial contribution to the EU amounted to about two-thirds of the net 
income of the Union, double the relative size of the German GDP in the EU. Mattli 1998: 104.   26 
ic concerns have not, as we have seen, provided a primary impetus for integration. In-
deed, had European policymakers been concerned exclusively with economic advan-
tages (and not with the “security externalities” of such advantages) they would likely 
have engaged in less extensive cooperation within weaker and geographically broader 
international institutions along the lines suggested by Britain. Today’s Europe would be 
radically different. 
 
3.ii The Zollverein (1834-1866) 
 
Introduction 
The German Zollverein was a comprehensive economic union, created in 1834 
alongside the existing German Confederation (“Deutsche Bund”). At its inception, the 
Zollverein united eighteen states within a single customs and administrative barrier. Dur-
ing the more than three decades of its existence, the union expanded to include a major-
ity of the German states. The Zollverein has often been described as the first non-political 
union among independent states (Price 1912; Viner 1950). Yet the Zollverein did not 
emerge in a political vacuum. Rather, it can be seen as a complement—an economic rein-
forcement, so to speak—to the existing German Bund, which focused mainly on military 
matters (Forsyth 1981: 160-1, 174-5; Huber 1957: 289). Together, I argue, these two institu-
tional structures amounted to a system for constraining the hegemonic potential of the 
strongest German state, Prussia. 
 
Existing scholarship has advanced two main explanations for the economic inte-
gration of Germany. The first holds that integration sprang from a desire to reduce eco-
nomic transaction costs. Interstate commerce in early nineteenth-century Germany was 
thwarted by antiquated restrictions, poor communications and high tariffs, all of which 
created pressure for market reform.47 Yet this explanation fails to convince. While there 
were certainly liberal forces pushing to abolish trade barriers, integration cannot be ex-
plained purely by a desire to promote economic exchange. After the collapse of the Conti-
nental System in 1815 most German states reverted to narrow economic protectionism 
and isolationism (Benaerts 1933: 63-72; Price 1949: 253; Kiesewetter 1987: 94).48 The lack 
of shared economic interests is also illustrated by the fact that the several conferences 
convened to discuss cooperation among the German states as a way to reduce the eco-
nomic distress that followed the Napoleonic Wars all came to naught (see Price 1912: 97). 
 
The second explanation suggests that integration was driven by nationalist senti-
ment. For example, Price depicts economic integration as a means consciously employed 
by German nationalists to achieve national unification (1949: 253). Most observers agree, 
however, that German nationalist sentiment was neither widespread nor strong enough to 
                                                 
47See Mattli 1999: 114-5. Mattli also stresses the integrating effect of the railroad: “the railway 
served not only to reduce transaction costs and widen markets, but also provided the single most 
powerful stimulus to Germany’s industrial development…the integrating effect of the railway is 
beyond doubt,” he claims. Yet the economic effects of the railway, which was mainly constructed 
after 1835, could hardly have been felt at the time of the founding of the Zollverein in 1834. See 
Roussakis 1968: 81. 
48Whereas the agrarian states and free cities of northern Germany favored free trade, southern 
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prompt integration. Indeed, scholars report divergent economic interests, political “klein-
staaterei” and religious tension among Catholic states in the South and Protestant states 
in the North (Benaerts 1933: 63-72; Henderson 1984: 95).  
 
Below, I seek to demonstrate that the main impetus for integration in Germany 
came from a hegemonic conflict in which a local great power, Prussia, threatened the eco-
nomic and political independence of other German states. To understand how this conflict 
prompted integration, it is necessary to appreciate that, at the time of integration, Prussia, 
while rapidly rising, was still in a relatively weak position within greater Germany, where 
she was balanced by the preponderant military power of Austria. Prussian leaders knew 
their ambition of leadership in Germany depended on averting a “total balance” of Ger-
man states against Berlin (Liska 1964: 76). In particular, the tendency of major secondary 
states like Bavaria and Württemburg to ally with Austria as well as the presence of exter-
nal threats from Russia and France meant that Prussia could hardly afford direct conflict 
with her smaller neighbors. Hence, the potential arose for other German states to bind her 
as she rose. 
 
The Rise of Prussia and the German Bund 
The Germany that emerged in 1815 after the Congress of Vienna included thirty-
eight states ranging in size from “great powers” (Prussia), middle-sized kingdoms (Bava-
ria, Württemberg, Saxony, Hanover) and duchies (Baden, Nassau, Oldenburg, Hesse-
Darmstadt) to independent cities like Hamburg, Bremen and Frankfurt-am-Main. Al-
though many German states were strengthened territorially by the Vienna settlement, the 
champion of the new German order was undoubtedly the kingdom of Prussia. Of 208,780 
square miles of German territory, 134,616, more than half, was Prussian. The second larg-
est German state was Bavaria, whose territories comprised a large chunk of southeast Ger-
many. Next in line by order of territory and population were Württemburg, Saxony and 
Baden (Kiesewetter 1987: 82).  
 
Despite territorial gains at Vienna, Prussia after 1815 is best described as revisionist. 
Sprawled across Central Europe with her territories divided by the intersecting lands of 
Hesse-Cassel and Hannover, Prussian leaders perceived a strong need to expand in order to 
increase security. The expansionist potential of Prussia was explicitly acknowledged at the 
Congress of Vienna, where it was decided to combine the many German states into a loose 
confederation with Austrian participation. This confederation would serve the dual aim of 
strengthening Germany against Russian and French revanchism and of preventing Prussia 
from gaining dominance within Germany (Carr 1979: 1-3). Yet, the divergent political and 
economic interests of the German states limited the potential of the Bund as a means to 
constrain Prussian power. When delegates from Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg 
and Hanover met in 1814 to draft a confederate constitution there was little they could 
agree on. Prussia favored a centralized structure that would allow it, by virtue of its pre-
ponderant size, to dominate the Bund. Austria wanted a loose political union that would 
leave it free to pursue its non-German objectives (Forsyth 1981: 45). The larger secondary 
states opposed any arrangement that might limit their sovereignty and sided with Aus-
tria. When a Confederate Act was signed on June 8, 1815, the result was therefore a weak 
constitution, relating mainly to external security and defense (Price 1949: 18-9; Forsyth 
1981: 48). The Bund had no central executive or judiciary powers. The only tangible brake   28 
on the abuse of power by leading states was the distribution of votes in the Federal Diet 
(the “Bundestag”), which met in Frankfurt-am-Main to consider common legislation: 
Votes were here allocated in a complicated manner such that the eleven larger states, in-
cluding Austria and Prussia, possessed one vote each, while the remaining states shared 
six votes among them. This system aimed to neutralize the power of Austria and Prussia 
by making it impossible for them, even if acting together with the four large kingdoms, to 
outvote and dominate the rest (Forsyth 1981: 48; Carr 1979: 4).  
 
The Bundestag initially had no executive machinery to secure implementation of 
its decrees (Roussakis 1968: 15). However, the Wiener Schlussakte of 1820 established a 
federal army raised and financed by member states on a quota basis49 and empowered 
the Union to take measures to preserve or restore peace, security and order within a 
member state, whether this was requested by the government in question or not, and to 
force members to comply with the Bundesakt (Werner 1977: 7). Despite limiting the for-
mal institutional power of larger states and providing for a common army, however, the 
Bund constituted at best a weak form of binding. Military integration was imperfect and, 
more importantly, the Bund lacked any form of economic integration to substantiate and 
consolidate the political agreement. This, it would soon be clear, was a crucial weakness 
since the expansionist potential of Prussia lay as much in its growing economic power as 
in its military might. 
 
The Zollverein 
The economic struggle that led to the formation of the Zollverein began with the 
Prussian Tax Law in 1818. This law unified Prussia’s territories by abolishing all internal 
duties and instituting a uniform external tariff. High transit dues were introduced in the 
eastern and western parts of Prussia, which lay on important trade routes (Kohr 1960: 
442; Hahn 1984: 20; Kiesewetter 1987: 92). The economic effects on Prussia’s neighbors 
were immediate and devastating. Industries in central and southern Germany—in Sax-
ony, Baden, Württemberg and Bavaria—had their chief outlets to the north, where their 
products reached the North Sea ports after travelling along the Rhine or Elbe rivers, the 
bulk of which were controlled by Prussia. The main roads to Poland and Russia also cut 
across Prussian territory.50 Transit dues thus constituted a formidable obstacle to trade 
in neighboring states and posed a direct and imminent threat to their economic sur-
vival51 (see Roussakis 1968: 51-2; Forsyth 1981: 166; Zechlin 1967: 83).  
                                                 
49Austria and Prussia provided each three corps, Bavaria one, and three additional corps were 
made up of troops from the remaining states. The usual strength of the army was 300,000 men. 
See Forsyth 1981: 49. 
50Roussakis 1968: 52. While official Prussian import duties ranged from 10-30 percent, in reality 
they were higher, since they were calculated by weight, mass or pieces rather than value. Since 
Germany experienced a general fall in prices after 1818, this meant that import duties calculated 
by value were in fact steadily rising. By one estimate the effective duty on many articles were in 
fact ranging from 60-100 percent. Hahn 1984: 21. 
51To appreciate the negative effects on other states, it is necessary to recall that, in the early nine-
teenth century, customs policy was largely synonymous with fiscal policy. In the absence of in-
come taxes, tariffs and duties were indispensable means for collecting state revenue and in many 
places accounted for up to 70 percent of government income (Hahn 1984: 34). The loss of receipts 
from tolls and customs thus constituted a serious threat to economic survival.    29 
Initially, other states sought to counter Prussia’s aggressive policies through bal-
ancing. In 1828, Bavaria and Württemberg set up a rival customs union in south Ger-
many and later in the same year the central German states established the Middle-
German Commercial Union. By 1834, no less than four separate tariff unions existed in 
Germany.52 These unions bear witness to both the limited degree of shared economic in-
terest among the German states as a whole and to the depth of resentment toward Prus-
sia’s policies. The anti-Prussian spirit of the new customs schemes was especially evident 
in the Commercial Union, which united the territories lying between Prussia and the 
Bavaria-Wurttemberg union (Mattli 1999: 118; Hahn 1984: 57). The Commercial Union 
did not erect a common external tariff, nor did it abolish internal trade barriers. The eco-
nomic interests of the members were so divergent that agreement was reached only on 
two points: to prevent the existing customs unions from expanding into central Ger-
many; and to divert transit trade away from Prussia by maintaining as many open north-
south trade routes as possible (Roussakis 1968: 60-1). To meet these goals, the treaty in-
troduced a series of discriminating transit dues aimed at hampering commerce between 
the eastern and western parts of Prussia, and prohibited its members from concluding 
trade agreements with members of other unions. About this arrangement historian Hein-
rich Treischke remarks, “. . . never before had particularism brought forth so monstrous, 
so unnatural an abortion. In the form of a huge barbed hood the area of the Union ex-
tended . . . across a motley collection of territories which, vis-à-vis Prussia, were only 
held together by a single common bond—fear and envy.”53  
 
Neither the South German nor the Commercial Union succeeded in halting Prus-
sia’s economic expansion. The secondary German states were generally too small to en-
joy any real advantage from a common external tariff. During its short lifetime the South 
German union collected less than half the revenue per capita of the Prussian customs 
scheme.54 The Commercial Union fared even worse (Mattli, 1999, 119). Realizing their 
fiasco and fearing their economic position would continue to deteriorate, Bavaria and 
Württemberg therefore decided to seek accommodation with Prussia through a treaty of 
economic union. On March 22, 1833, a treaty was drafted uniting the Prussian and Bavar-
ian customs unions.55 Simultaneous with this merger, a number of members of the Com-
mercial Union negotiated to join the new German Zollverein. In this way, argues Forsyth, 
“Prussia’s modernizing, expansionist and hegemonial policy provided the impetus to-
wards the . . . creation of the Zollverein” (Forsyth 1981: 166). 
 
 
 
                                                 
52The Prusso-Hessian customs union (1828), the South German Zollverein (1828), the Middle Ger-
man Commercial Union (1828) and the Steuerverein (1834). 
53Quoted in Roussakis 1968: 62. 
54Hahn 1984: 35. The yearly net income of the South German Union was 9.5 silbergroshen per ca-
pita compared to 24 silbergroshen in Prussia. Low revenues were mainly due to administrative 
costs, which absorbed 44 percent of the unions’ receipts compared to between 14-20 percent in 
Prussia. According to Zollvereins-pioneer Ludwig Kuhne high costs were due to the greater ratio 
of border-length to territorial size in these smaller states.  
55Treaty of Customs Union between Prussia, Hesse-Cassel and Hesse-Darmstadt, and Bavaria 
and Wurttemberg (March 22, 1833): Annual Register, 1838, 323-35, in Kertesz 1970: 73-4.   30 
The Zollverein as an Instance of Binding 
To what extent was the Zollverein a case of institutional binding? Economic inte-
gration in Germany cannot be explained by reference to nationalist sentiment: As Hender-
son (1984: 95) notes  
 
the notion that the Zollverein was set up as the result of the rise of a 
German national consciousness and was a touching example of brotherly co-
operation on the part of the various states will not bear for a moment. The 
states concerned fought for their own narrow interests and many of them 
joined the Zollverein only when economic depression made further resis-
tance to Prussia impossible.  
 
A purely economic explanation also fails. While integration stimulated trade and 
economic growth, the divergent economic interests of the various German states, illus-
trated by the creation of several competing customs schemes, and the repeated failure to 
reach agreement on economic cooperation within the German Bund suggests that incen-
tives to liberalize trade were not by themselves sufficient to spur large-scale integration. 
 
Instead, the evidence suggests that integration in Germany was motivated by a de-
sire to constrain the power of a rising Prussia. Prussia was clearly ascendant, her growing 
economic strength far outstripping that of neighboring states. While Prussia was balanced 
militarily by Austria within the German Bund, an economically protectionist and back-
ward Austria offered little help in balancing against Prussia in the economic sphere. 
Hence, the secondary German states sought instead to bind Prussia before it grew too 
strong. By doing so, they gained highly favorable terms. 
 
To what extent did the Zollverein bind Prussian economic power? When it took ef-
fect on January 1, 1834, the Zollverein comprised eighteen states with a total area of 
162,870 square miles. Its population was 23.5 million—15 million were Prussians (Rous-
sakis 1968: 70). Yet Prussia did not enjoy a hegemonic status. The union was based on a 
strict principle of legal equality. Each state had one vote in the central legislative body, 
the Customs Congress, where decisions were subject to unanimity and were directly 
binding on member states, “breaking” state law (Kohr 1960: 448; Forsyth 1981: 168). The 
execution of legislative decisions was monitored by a system of reciprocal surveillance 
by which members sent delegates to each other’s administrative offices. The treaty thus 
gave other states significant control and influence over Prussia’s policies.  
 
Several concrete bargains served to cement power sharing among Prussia and 
other German states. The Zollverein treaty instituted a common external tariff—equiva-
lent to the Prussian Tariff of 1818—but instituted free trade among members. Revenue 
from the common tariff system was pooled and distributed equally among member 
states in strict proportion to their population. This principle was highly favorable to sec-
ondary states because their per capita consumption was considerably smaller than Prus-  31 
sia’s (Mattli, 1999, 123). Thus the treaty in effect provided for economic redistribution 
from Prussia to other states.56  
 
In addition to economic redistribution, institutional binding was reinforced by 
high exit penalties—brought about by a highly centralized system for customs collection 
and, later, the adoption of a common currency—as well as efficiency gains. After the for-
mation of the Zollverein revenues everywhere increased dramatically. Tax revenues grew 
by 71 percent between 1834 and 1843 while population increased by only 22 percent 
(Henderson 1983: 141). This growth saved the smaller states from immediate economic 
ruin and led to a marked improvement in Prussia’s international bargaining position 
(Mattli 1999: 124-5). 
 
It’s easy to see why smaller states would opt for binding Prussia through integra-
tion. As Albrech-Carrie (1958: 62) observes, “the lesser German states were compelled to 
rally lastingly and organically around Prussia, as the sole alternative to disintegration of 
the German states system being followed upon by Prussian coercion.” But why did Prus-
sia consent? Why not simply coerce other states into cooperating with it on its own 
terms? Several factors are important. First, although Prussia was economically superior it 
did not reach military dominance until decades after the creation of the Zollverein. Al-
though Prussia had the upper hand economically, secondary states could credibly threat-
en to ally with a military stronger Austria. For this reason they were prepared to “ap-
pease” declining states with economic concessions. Another motivation for Prussia to 
pursue integration was to exclude Austria economically from the German sphere—a goal 
directly advanced by the Zollverein (Marriot 1915: 32; Price 1949: 298; Hamerow 1958; 
Albrecht-Carrie 1970: 53). Finally, there were significant efficiency gains to cooperation—
gains which made Prussia indifferent between conquering other states and cooperating 
with them on equal terms.  
 
The Dissolution of the Bund and German Unification 
The Zollverein institutionalized a balance of political and economic power that al-
lowed smaller German states to influence Prussian policy and saved them from eco-
nomic exploitation. In terms of the theoretical framework set out above, however, the 
Zollverein provided only a halfway mechanism for binding Prussian power. Although 
significant constraints were placed on Prussia’s economic power, the integration of mili-
tary resources remained limited to the sphere of German Bund, where pooling of mili-
tary forces was moderate and central command structures weak. Hence, the only imme-
diate guarantee against Prussian military expansion was the countervailing power of 
Austria. This arrangement was sound in 1834 but would not withstand the test of time. 
 
In May 1866 Prussian troops entered Schleswig-Holstein to expel Austrian forces 
there. In response Austria asked the German Bund to mobilize the federal army against 
Prussia. Despite warnings from Prussia that a vote in favor of the Austrian motion would 
be regarded as a declaration of war, most members of the Bund voted approved the mo-
tion. On the same day the vote was taken (June 14), Prussia announced its withdrawal 
                                                 
56E.g., Bavaria, which had collected two million florins in revenue per year from its customs 
union with Württemberg, obtained almost 4 million florins as a member of the Zollverein, See 
Henderson 1983: 141; Roussakis 1968: 76; Mattli 1999: 122, 148.   32 
from the Bund and on the following day delivered ultimatums to Saxony, Hanover, and 
Hesse-Cassel, ordering them to stop mobilization. When they refused, Prussian forces in-
vaded on June 16, 1866. This was followed by a declaration of war on Austria on June 18. 
Within three days, Saxony, Hanover and Hesse-Cassel were occupied and a week later 
Prussia defeated the Austrian army at Königgratz. Next, Prussia annexed Hanover, 
Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, Schleswig-Holstein and Frankfurt-am-Main and imposed a treaty 
of union on the seventeen German states north of the Main under Prussian leadership.57  
 
The Zollverein failed ultimately in binding Prussia’s growing power. As such we 
may ask whether the case does not in fact disconfirm the binding thesis. Yet, cases need 
not be successful to reveal information about the motivation behind a policy. Although 
the military and economic binding undertaken in the Bund and Zollverein did not pre-
vent German unification under Prussian leadership, the order of events and the form in-
tegration took suggests that the desire to constrain Prussian power was a key motivation 
behind integration. By integrating with Prussia at a time when she was still relatively 
weak, the secondary German states gained significant privileges and influence on Prus-
sian policy. When German unification was finally forced by Prussia the process thus took 
the form of a compromise as much as an act of conquest. The structure of the North Ger-
man Bund and even the subsequent German Empire fell far short of a centralized state 
but granted important rights to individual member states. Bavaria and Württemberg ob-
tained a permanent seat on the military committee of the Bundesrat, separate representa-
tion at peace negotiations and the chair of the committee on foreign affairs. They were 
also allowed to keep control of their armed forces (Craigh 1978). The minor German 
states also retained significant autonomy. The executive body of the Federation was the 
Bundesrat, in which Prussia had seventeen of fifty-eight votes, Bavaria six, and the 
smaller states each one vote, meaning that Prussia could in principle be outvoted on con-
stitutional and military questions (Carr, 1991, 126). Despite the centralizing efforts of 
Prussia, Germany thus remained a highly decentralized state in which the various 
“Länder” maintained a high degree of autonomy and privilege. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Regional integration historically has often followed in the wake of sustained hos-
tility and even outright aggression among integrating partners. This was the case in 
nineteenth-century Germany where the various German states were engaged in a fierce 
customs battle, each trying to starve others of fiscal revenue, and in twentieth-century 
Western Europe where integration followed on the heels of major war. Yet, the notion 
that states pursue integration following, or in some cases during, periods of great insta-
bility and conflict runs directly counter to the predictions of existing integration theories, 
which view integration as contingent on a stable geo-political environment, shared eco-
nomic interests and shared identities. Conceiving of integration as a solution to a re-
gional power transition dilemma, as I have done here, explains why integration often oc-
curs during periods of conflict and upheaval rather than in times of peace and growing 
economic interdependence. Moreover, by showing how integration can serve to con-
                                                 
57As a result of these annexations, Prussia after 1866 comprised 80 percent of population north of 
the Main. Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg, and Hesse-Darmstadt remained outside the North Ger-
man Confederation. Craig 1978: 12.    33 
strain the power of would-be dominant states, the institutional binding theory advanced 
in this paper explains a significant but rarely discussed feature of many existing integra-
tion schemes, namely a systematic asymmetry between the “real” and “institutional” 
power of leading member states. 
 
The analysis also has implications for general IR-theory. Rationalist theories of 
bargaining and war have generally concluded that, although states may have ex ante in-
terests in credibly committing not to fight, they are rarely if ever able to secure such 
commitments in the absence of third-party enforcement. I have demonstrated that sover-
eign states have in fact been able, via economic and military integration, to form credible 
commitments strong enough to avert war—even during volatile power transitions. Sec-
ond, the approach sheds new light on the relationship between integration and peace. 
IR-theorists have long stressed a positive link between regional integration and a reduc-
tion in militarized inter-state conflict. Yet, the causal relationship between integration 
and peace continues to divide scholars. Constructivists suggest that high levels of inter-
action associated with integration socialize leaders and populaces so that they come to 
regard resorting to violence as illegitimate. Liberals hold that an anticipated loss of gains 
from trade and other forms of economic cooperation associated with integration has a 
deterrent effect on states. Yet neither explanation generalizes. While some scholars find 
international trade is associated with peace (e.g. Polacheck 1980; Oneal and Russett 
1997), others find that it may induce conflict. Similarly, there are examples of communi-
ties with a long history of interaction and, presumably, high levels of socialization, 
which have broken apart in violent conflict—witness the former Yugoslavia. I have ar-
gued instead that the positive link between certain forms of regional integration and 
peace derives from a deliberate manipulation of regional power balances, which renders 
violent conflict redundant, whereas socialization and trade volumes play a secondary 
role.  
 
I have shown institutional binding at work in two historical cases. However, 
there are a number of other cases that may fit the theory. I have explored elsewhere how 
integration among the United Dutch Provinces was driven by a conflict between a rising 
Holland and a group of smaller declining Dutch states.58 There is also reason to believe 
that the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata, 1816 (the so-called Argentine Confeder-
ation) was motivated by fear of the hegemony of one of its members, namely Buenos 
Aires.59 Whether of not these cases fit the binding theory is a subject for future research.  
                                                 
58See author 2001. 
59According to Ames (1999: 231), “the greater growth of the province of Buenos Aires was 
viewed by other provinces as a clear threat, and the federation considered itself a brake on the 
hegemony of Buenos Aires.”   34 
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